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Hourly productivity levels in the UK still remain behind those in some competitor countries. The government
devotes much policy attention to enhancing productivity and continues to emphasise its five drivers—invest-
ment, innovation, skills, enterprise, and competition. This article argues that it is investment broadly defined
that is the key to sustained productivity improvement. The emphasis should be on improving productivity
simultaneously with improving the quality of production. Only thus will the gains be widely shared. In
achieving these aims there are two prerequisites for policy-makers. The first is to ensure better coordination
of policy than appears to be currently achieved by the present departmental structures in Whitehall. The
second is to recognize fully the long and complex chain of causation that can be triggered by pulling on one
policy lever. Such complexity can only be fully understood by more research on what actually goes on inside
the black box of the organization.
1 E-mail addresses: ken.mayhew@ox.ac.uk; a.neely@cranfield.ac.uk
2 See Griffith et al. (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
The UK’s productivity performance figures high on
the government’s agenda. For three and a half
decades after the Second World War, the country’s
productivity growth lagged that of most of its major
competitors, with the signal exception being the
USA. Since the early 1980s there has been some
catch up, but the UK’s levels of productivity per
hour remain lower than those of France, Germany,
and, of course, the USA. However, at a more
disaggregated level there are some interesting dif-
ferences in sectoral trends. Throughout the 1990s
the UK closed the gap in some sectors—most
notably in networked industries (electricity, gas, and
water), manufacturing, and business services. At
the same time it fell further behind in other sectors—
including wholesaling and retailing, financial inter-
mediation, and machinery and equipment.2 The
government is concerned about this for a number of
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reasons, including what it might indicate about the
UK’s productive efficiency and what it might imply
for international competitiveness and for standards
of living. The puzzle is that the aggregate hourly
productivity gap remains hard to close, despite
policy interventions on many fronts.
There is a large body of literature3 which attempts
to account for the UK’s historical productivity
failings. This issue of the Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy is mainly concerned with recent and
ongoing research on some of the factors which
current official thinking appears to believe will make
a significant difference—education and training,
management skills and practices, innovation, and
investment. Thus the emphasis of most of the
contributions is on the labour market and the
workplace and on getting inside the black box of the
organization. They represent some of the work
being done by members of an ESRC research
programme (AIM)4 and an ESRC research centre
(SKOPE).5
This introductory article attempts to put these con-
tributions into context and to show where they fit
into the broader policy debate. Section II briefly
discusses measurement issues and recent produc-
tivity performance. Section III introduces the gov-
ernment’s five levers of productivity growth, linking
them to a more traditional typology of the sources of
productivity growth, emphasizing in particular the
importance of distinguishing between the short run
and the long run. It points out some possible lacunae
in current policy thinking. Section IV concentrates
on a specific contribution of many of the articles in
this issue. This is to emphasize what is actually going
on within the organization and specifically to use
newly generated data sets to satisfy the need for
researchers to delve into the internal workings of the
organization in order to understand the true effects
of pulling on the government’s policy levers. Section
V presents some implications for research and for
policy, exploring the question of whether it is appro-
priate to think of UK policy.
II. DIFFERENT WAYS OF
MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY AND
UK PERFORMANCE
Conventionally, researchers employ two metrics of
productivity—labour productivity and total factor
productivity. In this article we concentrate on the
former. Three, rather different, measures of labour
productivity are deployed at the aggregate level:
output per capita, output per person employed, and
output per employed hour. The UK relative position
is different depending on the measure used. It is
behind the USA on all three. It is ahead of France
and Germany on output per capita. It is ahead of
Germany but behind France on output per person
employed, and behind France and Germany on
output per employed hour. These differences can be
explained by differences between countries in em-
ployment rates and hours worked per annum. The
UK’s employment rates are higher than those of
France and Germany, as are its annual hours of
work. Thus a relatively poor performance on output
per hour is, at least partially, compensated for by
these other two factors. In this context the govern-
ment takes some justifiable pleasure in the fact that
the UK’s relatively healthy rates of productivity per
hour in recent years have been achieved at the same
time as fast employment growth, since it might be
expected that the latter development would imply
the use of less productive workers. This section
concentrates on output per hour, since it is the most
direct indicator of productive efficiency.
Figure 1 is reproduced from HM Treasury and DTI
(2006). It demonstrates how the severely the UK’s
productivity growth lagged behind France and Ger-
many in the 1950–73 period, though it was a little
better than US performance. In the 1973–98 period,
UK productivity growth continued to be slower than
in France and Germany, but the differences were
much smaller and it remained faster than in the
USA. Figure 2, taken from the same publication, is
concerned with levels of output per hour for the
period 1990–2004. It shows how, in these more
3 See, for example, O’Mahoney (1999) and HM Treasury and DTI (2006).
4 Advanced Institute of Management Research.
5 Centre for Research on Skills, Knowledge and Organizational Performance.
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recent years, there has been some catch-up with
France, Germany, and the USA, though all three
countries remain ahead of the UK. Two other
comparator countries are also included—Japan and
Canada. The UK has also improved against both of
these countries and indeed its productivity per hour
is now greater than theirs. Their introduction into the
picture perhaps serves to remind us that not all is
doom and gloom. Compared to a number of major
countries the UK’s productivity performance is
healthy.
When measuring changes in productivity over time
an important problem is how changes in output are
Figure 1
History of Growth Rate of GDPa per Hour Worked
Note: a Average compound growth rate.
Source: HM Treasury and DTI (2006) (Crown copyright).
Figure 2
Output per Hour (UK = 100), 1990–2004
Source: HM Treasury and DTI (2006) (Crown copyright).
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measured. Obviously inflation effects have to be
stripped out of the time series for output. However,
this does not mean that all price increases should be
removed. If a price increase genuinely reflects an
increase in the quality of the product, then that
represents a real increase in the value of output and
should remain in the calculations. This is well known,
but how effectively official statisticians actually
cope with this methodological issue is another mat-
ter. The article by Gustavo Crespi, Chiara Criscuolo,
Jonathan Haskel, and Denise Hawkes (Crespi et
al., 2006) considers this issue in the context of
market services. We return to the significance of
the measurement problem in the next section when
we discuss the relationship between productivity
and competitiveness.
III. THE SOURCES OF
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH
COMPETITIVENESS
(i) The Five Drivers
In its official pronouncements the UK government
emphasizes the five ‘drivers of productivity growth’
and, indeed, publishes periodic scorecards designed
to indicate how the country is improving the strength
of these drivers (DTI, 2006). They are investment,
innovation, skills, enterprise, and competition. Be-
fore this particular terminology entered the policy
discourse, researchers used to describe productivity
growth as stemming either from gains in static
efficiency or gains in dynamic efficiency. Achieving
static efficiency is equivalent to what welfare econo-
mists would describe as achieving Pareto gains—
that is using existing factors of production as effec-
tively as possible. Arguably this is what much of Mrs
Thatcher’s ‘supply-side revolution’ was about—
the introduction of measures to make markets oper-
ate more competitively and efficiently. Dynamic
efficiency is all about investment. Physical invest-
ment in new machinery and the like may embody
technical progress, in which case a new machine
designed to perform the same function as the one it
replaces will perform that function more effec-
tively. Investment in knowledge (R&D), if success-
fully translated into organizational operations, al-
lows labour and capital to be put to more productive
use. Investment in human beings, whether in full-
time education or in the workplace, increases hu-
man capital and—it is assumed—makes them more
productive.
How do the five drivers fit with this typology?
‘investment’ and ‘skills’ are most clearly linked to
dynamic efficiency. ‘Competition’ appears to be
more closely related to static efficiency, while ‘inno-
vation’ and ‘enterprise’ have both dynamic and
static elements. But, of course, the picture is, in fact,
more complex than that. Take the example of lean
manufacturing. Presumably that would be classified
as a ‘static innovation’. Yet to adopt lean manufac-
turing techniques successfully a company might
well have to make investments in technology and in
skills. Or, take the example of investment in skills.
Whether such investment is funded by the govern-
ment or by the employer, the gains would only be
fully realized if organizations actually deployed these
new skills appropriately. In both cases the initial
action is insufficient on its own and other actions
(whether public or private) are necessary. In the
first example a static ‘improvement’ requires ac-
companying investment. In the second example, an
investment requires accompanying ‘static’ changes.
Clearly, a closer reading of government publications
uncovers officialdom’s awareness of this point and
of the many complexities and interactions involved
in the process of pulling a particular policy lever and
observing the final consequences. However, in
focusing the policy discourse on these drivers, we
would argue that there has been insufficient atten-
tion paid to the interactions between the drivers, to
the organization of work and production within
organizations, and to the interaction between policy
and what is actually happening within organizations.
One dimension of this is the need to use more
explicitly what has been termed an ‘open policy
framework’. This terminology is meant to reflect
the fact that companies who are engaged in interna-
tional competition, and particularly those who are
actually or potentially internationally mobile when
making decisions about the location of their produc-
tion, are unlikely to be thinking specifically about
how to make ‘UK plc’ a more a more productive or
economically efficient place. Rather, they are con-
cerned about their own competitive position, which
might imply that they make decisions that are incon-
sistent with the government’s declared strategy and
rhetoric—specifically, their thinking may be much
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less UK-centric. In other words, there is a sort of
principal–agent problem. The utility functions of the
agents (individual organizations) are not the same as
that of the government.
As suggested above, arguably UK policy under the
Thatcher and Major governments concentrated on
reforms to achieve static efficiency gains. This was
the rhetoric of the supply-side revolution. Relatively
little was done specifically to stimulate physical
investment or investment in R&D. Or, at least,
policies to improve physical investment perform-
ance and R&D performance did not, on conven-
tional measures, appear to have had much success.
Investment/GDP ratios did not improve significantly.
Nor did R&D/GDP ratios. The big exception on the
investment side was education and training. If any-
thing, the post-1997 Labour government has put
even more emphasis on measures to improve edu-
cation and training provision. There have been
significant increases in both public and private ex-
penditure, while outcomes—at least in terms of
qualifications—have improved. But more generally
than this, the government has appeared to empha-
size the investment/dynamic aspects rather more,
as articulated in its five levers. However, invest-
ment/GDP ratios remain stubbornly low, as do
R&D/GDP ratios. Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the
point. Figure 3 shows the significant differences in
terms of inputs invested in R&D between the UK
and its major industrial competitors. In the 20 years
to 2003, the UK has invested, on average, 2 per cent
of annual GDP in R&D. This compares with the 2.6
per cent for the USA and the 2.8 per cent for Japan.
Even more striking, the UK investment as a propor-
tion of GDP has fallen over this 20-year period, from
2.2 per cent in 1983 to 1.9 per cent in 2003, while the
USA has remained stable in its commitments to
R&D (from 2.6 per cent in 1983 to 2.7 per cent in
2003) and Japan has increased its investment (from
2.3 to 3.2 per cent, over the same period). Given
these trends, it is difficult to see how the UK can
conform either to the UK government’s own target
of 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2014 or the European
Union target of 3 per cent by 2010.
The three significant contributors to gross domestic
expenditure on R&D (GERD) are business enter-
prise (BERD), government (GOVERD), and higher
education (HERD).6 Figures 4 and 5 show the UK’s
performance on the first two of these in the last 20
years.
Figure 3
GERD as a Percentage of GDP: UK vs Major Comparators
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.
6 There is a fourth contributor to GERD—private non-profit expenditure on R&D—but this tends to be marginal, typically less
than 5 per cent of GERD.
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Figure 4
BERD Relative to GDP: UK vs Major Comparators
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.
Figure 5
GOVERD Relative to GDP: UK vs Major Comparators
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.
As Figure 4 shows, UK business expenditures on
R&D relative to GDP have been decreasing (reach-
ing a level of 1.2 per cent by 2003), while the
investments made by the UK’s major comparator
countries have been increasing (in 2003 Germany
was 0.5 per cent above the UK, while the USA was
0.6 per cent above the UK, and Japan 1.12 per
cent). These differences are not a result of higher
GDP growth rates in the UK relative to comparator
countries, but a consequence of a lower volume of
investment in R&D (relative to country size). When
we look at the absolute levels of investment per
capita (at constant prices), the annual growth rate in
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per cent for the UK, while the USA had an annual
growth rate of 2.7 per cent and Japan had an annual
growth rate of 4.5 per cent.
A similar story emerges when we look at GOVERD.
As Figure 5 shows, UK GOVERD displays a
decreasing trend over the last 20 years. By 2003 the
UK was the country with the lowest percentage of
GOVERD to GDP (0.18 per cent). This compares
to 0.33 per cent for the USA and 0.43 per cent for
France. Moreover, in contrast with BERD, in the
case of GOVERD there is also a decreasing trend
in terms of volume of investment per capita over the
whole period 1981–2003.
The one exception to these trends is HERD, where
the UK has followed a pattern of investment similar
to that of its major competitors, both in terms of
investment relative to GDP and investment per
capita (see Figure 6). It is worth noting that, regard-
ing HERD per capita, the UK has the second
highest annual growth rate over the period 1981–
2003, behind only the USA (3.5 per cent and 4.3 per
cent, respectively).
(ii) Productivity in the Short or Long Run?
Productivity is not an end in its own right. It is a
means to an end. Of particular importance here is its
relationship with competitiveness. The nature of this
relationship depends on whether we are considering
competitiveness in the short run or in the long run. In
the short run, competitiveness is about price. Every-
thing else (labour costs, profit margins, and ex-
change rates) being equal, faster relative growth of
productivity means an increase in international com-
petitiveness. As Boltho (1996) discussed, competi-
tiveness in the longer run is a more complex matter
and different authorities provide rather different
definitions. Following the OECD, policy-makers
would be concerned to help construct an economy
where British firms as a whole could maintain their
shares of international markets while the gains from
trade were widely distributed across the country’s
population. This is not the same as maintaining
short-run cost and price competitiveness. Indeed,
for a country like the UK, competing simply on price
seems not to be an option in the modern international
community, not least because the cost base of the
UK is considered too high to compete with cheaper
foreign locations. Even if it were an option, the
consequential squeeze on labour costs would have
unfortunate distributional implications. Rather, the
UK needs to compete on quality and product niche.
In the context of this issue there are two implica-
tions. The measurement of productivity change
which makes adequate allowance for quality changes
over time takes on an added imperative, simply as a
matter of knowing where we are now and where we
are heading. Second, sources of productivity change
which are consistent with maintaining or moving
towards a higher value-added strategy are to be
Figure 6
HERD Relative to GDP: UK vs Major Comparators
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators.
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preferred to those which simply involve maintaining
a low value-added route. This is the social impera-
tive. The private interests of individual firms may be
different. Critically, we need to be wary of policy
initiatives which (wittingly or unwittingly) provide
signals and/or incentives to agents in the economy
that discourage or militate against moves to the
higher value-added route. Or, to put the matter more
positively, we need to seek out policy initiatives
which positively incentivize organizations to take the
higher value-added road.
IV. WHAT GOES ON INSIDE THE
FIRM?
(i) Education and Training
One of the five drivers is ‘skills’. There has been a
huge increase in the supply of educated and trained
people. The article by Ewart Keep, Ken Mayhew,
and Jonathan Payne (Keep et al., 2006) reminds us
that simply increasing the supply of educated and
trained people may be a necessary condition for
increasing productivity, but that it may not be a
sufficient one. The key questions are how effec-
tively skills are utilized by employers and also how
motivated individuals are to use their skills. The
answers will depend on a complex of factors influ-
encing the skill intensity of the production process.
The demand for skills from employers cannot be
neglected. This observation is consistent with the
inconclusive microeconometric evidence on the re-
lationship between work-related training and pro-
ductivity. Until recently, most of this work has been
inferential, reflecting problems of collecting reliable
micro data on productivity. Much of this work finds
a positive relationship between training and wages,
assumes that higher wages reflect higher productiv-
ity, and therefore infers a positive impact of training
on productivity. In a recent review article, Edwin
Leuven (2004) makes some interesting observa-
tions about this approach. He concludes that the
majority of these studies, which rely on fixed-
effects modelling, probably overestimate the ‘re-
turns’ to training. The main reason for this is the
failure of such studies to allow adequately for other
characteristics of those who receive training which
would make them more productive and therefore
higher earners. Dearden et al. (2006) claim to
provide direct evidence on the relationship between
training and productivity ‘for the first time for the
UK and for the first time anywhere over a long
period’. They remind us that only in a strict neoclas-
sical model would wages be a direct measure of
productivity. However, they contend, since ‘in-
creases in wages have to be paid out of productivity
gains, real wage increases should provide a lower
bound on the probable size of productivity increases’.
They argue that the few studies which investigate
the relationship directly are flawed because the
training is measured at only one point in time ‘and
could be picking up many unobservable firm specific
factors correlated with both training and productiv-
ity’. Their own modelling suggests that ‘a 1% point
increase in training is associated with an increase in
value added per hour of about 0.6%’. However,
even their methodology may be picking up some
spurious effects. For example, although capital per
worker is included in their regressions, it is not clear
whether this is adequate to pick up the impact of
capital investment, its time profile, and the possibility
of embodied technical progress.
The most important point, however, is that even if
some impact of training on productivity is detected,
this is perfectly consistent with the argument that
how much (if any) impact training has depends on
the accompanying product and production strate-
gies of the organization in which the training takes
place. Thus particular increments in education and
training provision cannot be guaranteed to have
positive impacts on economic performance. A re-
lated issue is revealed by consideration of the
adequacy of training data used. Generally, econo-
metricians working in this area use identified train-
ing episodes as their independent variable. Of course,
researchers can use only what is available, but in
adopting this approach they may be only partially
capturing training broadly defined. They are almost
certainly neglecting on-the-job training and develop-
ment, which are closely linked to the precise nature
of the production process and of job design. Reali-
zation of this point, that the accumulation of human
capital is in part endogenously determined, might
slightly change the focus of policy.
(ii) Management Skills and Practices
Management skills and practices are analysed in
great depth in this issue. In terms of the five drivers,
we can think of these as falling under the general
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heading of innovation and, more specifically, man-
agement innovation. Case-based data in manage-
ment studies illustrate the many management inno-
vations that have occurred in organizations, for
example just-in-time production, total quality man-
agement, and business process re-engineering. One
challenge for researchers is the faddish nature of
these management innovations. While the underly-
ing principles may be consistent, the persistent
introduction of so-called management innovations
makes their study problematic. One of the current
innovations that is in vogue is Six Sigma, yet many
have argued that Six Sigma is little more than a
careful repackaging of quality tools and techniques
that have been discussed in various guises since the
1950s. Even if tools and techniques were not con-
stantly being recycled, it can be difficult to evaluate
the real significance and impact of these develop-
ments as the same terminology can describe prac-
tices which differ greatly in their real content and
appropriateness. Some data, which might allow
researchers to probe more deeply into these issues,
have existed within the firms for a long time, but
many researchers have found it very difficult to
access such data. There are a number of reasons
for this. First, such data are usually proprietary and
firms, not surprisingly, are concerned about the
competitive implications of releasing them. Second,
accessing the data requires researchers to build
deep relationships with senior managers in firms,
many of whom see little benefit in working with
academics to explore intellectually interesting ques-
tions unless they have direct practical relevance. A
number of papers in this issue make great strides to
rectify this situation and allow us to start to open the
black box and to investigate what actually goes on
within organizations. In their article in this issue,
Rachel Griffith, Jonathan Haskel, and Andy Neely
(Griffith et al., 2006a), for example, look at manage-
ment quality within a firm and conclude that it is a
significant determinant of productivity differences
between the firm’s different establishments. Thus,
even in a single organization which attempts to
establish a common set of practices and procedures
for all of its establishments, there is considerable
heterogeneity of productivity outcomes. According
to the data, management quality is a major factor in
explaining this heterogeneity, although additional
studies within the firm also highlight the heterogene-
ity of practice even within the same organization. Of
course, the authors have to tackle the difficult, and
only partially resolved, issue of how to measure
quality. Eschewing input (for example, educational
attainment) or process (management practices)
indicators, they opt for a variety of ‘outcome’
indicators. Adopting a ‘balanced scorecard’ ap-
proach, they compare establishments on indicators
such as customer satisfaction, stock availability, and
operational standards. Importantly, the variables
used in this study are those that have been defined
as significant by the managers of the firm rather
than the researchers. In essence, Griffith et al.
(2006a) use data that the firm generates to manage
its own performance to explore productivity varia-
tions. The great advantage of this is that the per-
formance variables used are meaningful to the
organization and its competitive context. This is
something that is often overlooked in many aca-
demic studies, where more traditional, but arm’s
length—at least to the firm—measures of perform-
ance are proposed.
Griffith et al. (2006a) is representative of a new
area of research—micro studies within firms and
econometric case studies. Their study is grounded in
the UK. Derek Jones, Panu Kalmi, and Antti
Kauhanen (Jones et al., 2006) are representative of
a similar approach in a different national context—
Finland. They describe a series of microeconometric
studies of branches within the same (retailing) firm.
They find that different interpretations and imple-
mentations of a given firm’s human resource man-
agement (HRM) policies by managers at individual
establishments have an effect on productivity. What
they describe as ‘on-the-job participation’ and ‘in-
formation sharing’ are found to be of particular
significance. Thus, in contrast to Griffith et al.
(2006a), they use process as opposed to output
indicators. But what both studies demonstrate is the
elusiveness of the concept of management quality,
at least when it comes to taking external action to
improve it. Managers who have the same level of
training and education and who are subject to the
same head office guidelines, policies, and con-
straints, produce very different performances and
outcomes. This serves to remind us that the govern-
ment’s levers can have weak or uncertain pur-
chase.
Changing management practices may be designed
to extract greater productivity but they carry the
danger that the actual or perceived welfare of
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workers suffers as a consequence if they involve
work intensification, loss of discretion, or intense
supervision. This could imply indirect, harmful con-
sequences for productivity because of the damage
caused to worker morale. Nick Bloom and John
Van Reenen (2006) give us partial, but not full,
reassurance here. Analysing a sample of over 700
medium-sized manufacturing firms in the UK, the
USA, France, and Germany, they find that manage-
ment quality is associated with higher productivity,
but that, contrary to the perceptions of some com-
mentators, good ‘work–life balance’ practices are
associated with higher management quality. Thus,
they argue, this route to better productivity perform-
ance is not inimical to the quality of working life. This
gives us only partial reassurance for two reasons.
First, their sample is confined to manufacturing; we
need to know more about other sectors. Second,
their research discusses work–life balance largely
in terms of family-friendly policies. While these are
important, they do not cover important dimensions
of modern employment—work intensification and
discretion at work. Both of these dimensions are
particularly important in the context of the declining
influence of unions. The work of Green and others7
suggests strongly that recent years have witnessed
significant loss of discretion in a whole variety of
respects—for example, the allocation of time to
different tasks, the way a task is performed, and the
time allowed to complete it. This development has
been a feature of jobs across the whole spectrum
and not just among the less skilled. The conse-
quences for productivity are uncertain and will
depend on each specific workplace setting.
(iii) Innovation and Corporate Restructuring
Moving on from management skills and practices,
but still falling under the heading of innovation, we
turn to some questions concerning structural change
of various types within organizations. Mari Sako
(2006) discusses one aspect of structural change in
her article on productivity in business services. She
contrasts this sector with manufacturing. Manufac-
turing has seen productivity growth, and the gap
with the USA has been largely closed. In part this is
because unproductive firms have closed in the UK.
Thus productivity growth has been accompanied by
a decline in employment in the sector. By contrast,
in business services productivity growth has been
accompanied by employment growth. It is also a
sector which has witnessed substantial outsourcing
and offshoring. The state of knowledge is such that
we cannot precisely disentangle the various sources
of productivity growth. But Sako points out that, in
general terms, productivity growth can come from
two sources. The first is from ‘standardizing and
consolidating processes’. The other is from ‘moving
into higher-value-added activities’. Either can occur
when a firm restructures via vertical disintegration
or via the unbundling of corporate functions. As far
as offshoring and outsourcing are concerned, Sako
raises at least three (not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive) possibilities. The first is that offshoring allows
companies to engage in a variety of forms of work
intensification and HRM practices which extract
greater ‘effort’ from the workforce. The second is
that the tendency of companies to outsource certain
activities to specialist business service firms allows
the latter to obtain economies of scale from a variety
of sorts from specialization. The third, which could
be linked or not to outsourcing (or for that matter
offshoring), is improvement in the ‘quality’ of serv-
ice which allows an increase in price to reflect this
higher quality and thus an increase in productivity
measured on a value-added basis. She emphasizes
that at the moment we do not have enough data to
pin down the precise nature of these phenomena.
For instance, we are surprisingly ignorant of the
relative skill content of functions which are offshored.
However, her article does serve to remind us of the
need to think in terms of the open policy framework
mentioned earlier. Organizations are not necessar-
ily confining their thinking to the UK when consid-
ering how to improve productivity, or whether they
will cut costs and maintain existing product specifi-
cation, or move to higher-value-added production.
(iv) Innovation and R&D
Again exploiting firm-level data, Rachel Griffith,
Elena Huergo, Jacques Mairesse, and Bettina Pe-
ters (Griffith et al., 2006b) explore another dimen-
sion of innovation for four countries—France, Ger-
many, Spain, and the UK. They make the point that
expenditure on R&D is one thing, while its imple-
mentation and exploitation is another. They set up a
four-equation model to describe four stages of the
7 See, for example, Felstead et al. (2002) and Green (2006).
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process: the amount of effort directed towards
innovation; the extent of investment in R&D; the
influence of this investment on knowledge leading to
process and product innovation; and the impact of
this knowledge on output. Their results suggest that,
in terms of productivity, Germany has little more to
gain from innovation, France could gain from both
product and process innovation, while Spain and the
UK could gain from product innovation.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Good productivity performance is a means to an
end. From the perspective of the national economic
interest, it is a route towards achieving a more
internationally competitive economy. Our arguments
suggest that it is competitiveness in the long run that
should be of more vital interest to any government
than competitiveness in the short run. This has
implications for both policy and research. For the
policy-maker the message is to beware of measures
which might encourage organizations to adopt short-
run productivity-enhancing measures at the ex-
pense of ‘moving up market’. In other words,
productivity gains can be achieved either by in-
creasing ‘efficiency’ of production for any given
quality of product or by increasing quality and
therefore the value-added price. There can be little
doubt as to which is the preferable route. Otherwise,
significant proportions of British workers will be
confined to low-rewarding jobs and possibly to jobs
of high work intensity and low discretion. For re-
searchers, the message is to put more effort into
getting the right measures of productivity growth
which accurately reflect quality improvements.
Without this, it will be difficult to monitor exactly
what progress is being made.
The government realizes that it is important to be
aware of the relative importance of the different
factors that might influence productivity. This is
evident, for example, in HM Treasury and DTI
(2006, ch. 4), where various estimated effects of
particular variables are mentioned, such estimates
being typically derived from the econometric appli-
cation of growth-accounting techniques. However,
it is equally important for researchers to help make
the government more acutely aware that the ulti-
mate impact of, for instance, any given increase in
training or education or in spending on R&D de-
pends critically upon complex, interwoven strings of
causation which are not necessarily constant over
time. Getting within the black box of the organization
will help us unravel some of these strings. We see
significant variations even within a very homogene-
ous set of branches of an individual organization.
This is where micro case studies and micro-
econometric case studies are starting to be of
assistance. But these are very early days.
It is also important to consider the role of national
policy in light of globalization and the trends towards
offshoring and outsourcing. Today’s global busi-
nesses are choosing to source support from a wide
variety of geographical locations. India and China
are rapidly emerging as significant centres—both of
this support and of knowledge production more
generally. The challenge for the UK is to consider
whether the country should adopt a competitive or
cooperative stance with regard to these economies.
The traditional model of policy formulation asks
what should the UK do. An alternative model
would ask how can the UK leverage develop-
ments in other countries. Does the UK need to
encourage concentration on all five of the Treas-
ury’s drivers to close the productivity gap, or would
it be better advised to explore how it might collabo-
rate with other countries to share the burdens of
investment. This is tantamount to policy-makers
adopting an ‘open policy’ framework in the same
way that many firms are now describing their
innovation activity as ‘open innovation’. Firms rec-
ognize that they do not have the monopoly on good
ideas and innovations. Instead, they have to build the
capability to access the innovations of others and, in
return, allow others to access their innovations. If
the same thinking process were adopted for policy,
then the challenge for the UK would be how the
country can access the investment, innovation, skills,
enterprise, and competition developed by other
economies.
Such thinking requires a significant shift towards
joined-up policy. Yet one of the constraints that
hinders this is the fact that different arms of govern-
ment have responsibility for different policy drivers.
The Department for Education and Skills, for exam-
ple, is charged with increasing the stock of educated
and trained labour. The Department for Trade and
Industry lays claim to innovation policy and business
regulation, which clearly links to enterprise and
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competition. Yet who is responsible for trying to
ensure that these policies are aligned and their
impacts adequately exploited? The DfES might
worry about increasing the stock of educated and
trained labour, yet which government department
worries about whether this trained labour has the
right skills and whether these skills are being ad-
equately utilized in the workplace? If the DTI
‘owns’ innovation policy, who ensures that it is
enacted? In every recent innovation policy paper
there has been a call for the government to use its
significant purchasing spend more strategically to
stimulate innovation. Yet there is little evidence that
this call is ever heeded, either by government depart-
ments or by those that they are trying to influence.
Perhaps this is the key point made in this issue—
namely, that simplistic attempts to pull policy levers
as if they were independent of one another and of
other global developments is naïve. It is high time the
UK moved to a more nuanced policy debate that
recognizes the heterogeneity of practice and imple-
mentation, the importance of globalization, and the
fact that simple thinking in terms of policy drivers is
unlikely to result in sustained and sustainable suc-
cess. On balance, the research evidence clearly
suggests that it is investment in its many forms that
is most likely to secure productivity gains in the long
run. The challenge for policy and practice is how to
ensure that such investments are coordinated and
integrated to maximize their value and impact.
